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I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff, Allied Bank International,1 brought an action in July
1983 against three banks owned by the Republic of Costa Rica 2 to
recover $4.5 million in principal, plus accrued interest on a series
of promissory notes.3 Defendants began repaying the notes in 1978
in accordance with an agreed repayment schedule.4 In 1981, Costa
Rica experienced severe economic disruptions, 5 resulting in government directives that Defendants defer payment of external debt.
'1 Allied Bank International is the agent for a syndicate
of 39 commercial banks. The
syndicate is comprised of banks from the United States, the People's Republic of China,
Switzerland, West Germany, Spain, Taiwan, France, Japan, England, and Sweden. Allied
Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. April 23,
1984), aff'g 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1985) (No. 85-146).
2 Defendant banks are Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, Banco Anglo Costarricense,
and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1140.
' Defendants assumed the obligations at issue in 1976 after the failure of the Latin American Bank, a bank principally doing business in Costa Rica. Defendants issued new promissory notes upon their assumption of the Latin American Bank's obligations. Allied Bank,
No. 83-7714, slip op. at 3218 (2d Cir., April 23, 1984).
' The repayment schedule provided for 11 "unconditional," semi-annual payments to be
made in New York City with United States dollars. The schedule also provided that Defendants' failure to pay the required interest or principal within 30 days of a scheduled payment date would constitute default. Upon default, Plaintiff could demand full payment of
the notes. Allied Bank, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 3218 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984).
Costa Rican foreign debt totaled approximately $3 billion in 1984. Wall St. J., Apr. 5,
1984, at 34, col. 5.
6 Foreign exchange transactions by Costa Rican banks require approval by the Central
Bank of Costa Rica. On July 2, 1981, Defendants applied to the Central Bank for authorization to make the payment due the syndicate on July 1. On August 27, 1981, the Central
Bank passed a resolution prohibiting banks from paying any interest or principal on debts
to foreign creditors denominated in foreign currency.
On November 6, 1981, the President of Costa Rica and the Ministry of Finance published
Executive Decree 13103-H, prohibiting any Costa Rican financial institution from making
payment on an external debt without prior approval of the Central Bank. Subsequently, the
Bank notified each defendant that all debt repayments were to be suspended indefinitely.
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1442
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Consequently, Defendants failed to make their required payments.7 Plaintiff then brought suit for full payment in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.'
The district court dismissed Plaintiff's petition, relying on the
act of state doctrine. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but failed to address the act
of state question.10 The appellate court ruled that, regardless of act
of state considerations, unilateral deferral of international debt is
permissible since such deferral is consistent with United States law
and policy." On rehearing held: reversed. A foreign government's
unilateral deferral of extraterritorial debt falls outside the scope of
the act of state doctrine and is inconsistent with the law and policy
of the United States. Allied Bank Internationalv. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 3215 (2d Cir. April 23,
1984), aff'g 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated on reh'g,
757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3086 (U.S. July 26, 1985) (No. 85-146).

(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984), vacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516
(2d Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed 54 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1985) (No. 85-146).
7 The Costa Rican economic crisis also resulted in Costa Rica's default during 1981 on
loans granted to it by the United States under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.), Allied
Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 3220 (2d
Cir. April 23, 1984).
8 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
' Generally, the act of state doctrine gives effect to acts of a foreign sovereign done within
its own territory. See infra notes 12-38 and accompanying text. The courts have, however,
declined to apply the doctrine to a sovereign's purely commercial acts. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550
F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). Here, the district court stated that the
actions of the Costa Rican government were clearly an exercise of a governmental, rather
than a commercial function, permitting invocation of the act of state doctrine. Allied Bank,
566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
'0 On September 9, 1983, after the district court's dismissal, Defendants, the Costa Rican
government, and the Costa Rican Central Bank signed a refinancing agreement with the
coordinating agent for Costa Rica's external creditors. Only one of the 39 banks in the Allied
Syndicate, Fidelity Trust Company of New Jersey, refused to accept the agreement. It is
this lone bank that Allied International represented on appeal. Allied Bank International v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 3220 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984).
"l Id. at 3215. As in the district court, Plaintiff argued that Costa Rica's actions should
not be sanctioned under act of state principles because the government acted as a commercial entity and not as a sovereign. The court found that the Costa Rican government was
"clearly acting as a sovereign in preventing a national fiscal disaster." Consequently, the
court concluded that the act of state doctrine remained applicable. Id.

A
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

United States courts have long employed the act of state doctrine in sanctioning the seizure of property by foreign nations.' 2
The classic statement of the doctrine articulated the sanctity of
each nation's territorial sovereignty: "[E]very sovereign state is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory"'" (emphasis added). The theoretical basis upon which courts have applied the doctrine have included separation of power concerns 4
and considerations of international comity. 15
While giving effect to intraterritorial takings by foreign governments on act of state grounds,'" the United States judiciary has
severely restricted foreign seizure of property within the United
States.' Courts generally permit such extraterritorial expropriations only if they are consistent with the law and policy of the
United States.'" An early case, Canada Southern Railway Co. v.
Gebhard,'9 implicitly applied this standard when the Canadian
government attempted to bind United States bondholders to its
reorganization of the government-owned Canadian Southern Railway's debt.2 0 The United States Supreme Court dismissed the
12E.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
" Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
" Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Sabbatino court found
the basis of the act of state doctrine in the "relationships between branches of government
in a system of separation of powers." Id. at 423.
16 United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). "'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the ... acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
" See supra note 12.
" Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub
noma.Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). See also
United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of Iraq v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
is E.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
"'Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
20 In 1871, the Canadian Southern Railway issued a series of negotiable bonds. Both principal and interest were payable at a New York bank. In 1873, the railway failed to meet its
interest obligations to its bondholders. Numerous bondholders agreed to extend the time for
the payment of the interest.
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bondholder's suit, thus giving effect to the Canadian government's
unilateral modification of its obligations.2 The court reasoned that
its action was in harmony with the spirit of United States bankruptcy law2 2 and in keeping with a desire to preserve international
213
comity.
Conversely, modern cases addressing foreign seizure of private
United States debts have uniformly rejected contentions that such
action comports with domestic law and policy. 2 4 In United Bank
Ltd. v. Cosmic International,5 the newly formed government of
Bangladesh issued decrees providing for the seizure of United
States debts owed to the pre-revolution predecessor government.
The Bangladesh government acknowledged that no compensation
had been paid for the purportedly seized debts, but argued that
the act of state doctrine precluded inquiry by the United States
judiciary. 26 Noting that the doctrine is inapplicable to extraterritorial takings, the appellate court denied effect to the government's
actions. The court stated that extraterritorial takings without just
compensation could never be consistent with United States

The Parliament of Canada gained legislative authority over the Canada Southern Railway
in 1874. In 1878, the Parliament approved legislation permitting the financially strapped
railway to issue replacement bonds to its existing bondholders as a way of meeting its financial obligations. The old bonds of 1871, thus invalidated, "were to be exchanged for the new
[bonds] at the rate of one dollar of principal of the old for one dollar of the new, nothing
being given . . . for past due interest coupons .
Id. at 529, 530.
Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
3 Id. at 539. The "spirit" of United States bankruptcy law as perceived by the Gebhard
court "require[s] each individual to so conduct himself for the general good as [to] not unnecessarily injure another . . . .[E]very member of a political community must necessarily
part with some of the rights which, as an individual, not affected by his relation to others,
he might have retained." Id. at 536.
The basic purpose behind United States bankruptcy laws has not changed in the one
hundred years since Gebhard. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174
(1982), is a debt reorganization procedure designed to maximize the yield from the debtor's
assets without withdrawing control from the debtor or liquidating its assets for the creditor's immediate satisfaction. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220
(1977), reprinted-in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963.
23 Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
" E.g., Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). Compare Comment, Act of State Doctrine Does Not Enable Foreign Sovereign to Confiscate Debts with
Situs in the United State, 9 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 515 (1977).
26 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
26 Id. at 871-77. The court noted that the basic United States policy is derived from the
United States Constitution. Id. at 877. The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides in
pertinent part: "nor [shall any person] be deprived of... property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
Const. amend. V.
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policy. 27
Similarly, in Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa
Rica,28 a case addressing facts virtually identical to those of Allied
Bank, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York considered whether a government-ordered default by a
Costa Rican bank was subject to scrutiny by a United States
court. 29 In that case, plaintiff Libra Bank and sixteen other banks
30
loaned $40 million to defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
Defendant paid the first installment due under the loan but was
unable to make further repayment because of a series of resolutions adopted by the Costa Rican government prohibiting payment
of external debt.3 1 In response to Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, Defendant argued that the act of state doctrine required
the court to give effect to the Costa Rican government's directives.3 2 The court found this contention meritless based on its conclusion that the situs of the debt at the time of the Costa Rican
decrees was not Costa Rica, but New York, thereby permitting judicial inquiry.3 3 The court located the debt in New York because
the Costa Rican banks had consented to jurisdiction in New York
and had, pursuant to the loan contract, agreed to make all payments to an American bank in New York. 4 Citing numerous cases
from the Second Circuit, 35 the court then held that the Costa Rican resolutions clearly violated United States law, since "a foreign

542 F.2d at 877.
570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
" Id.
The Libra case was decided one month after Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Griesa, J.), in the same
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
30 570 F. Supp. at 874. The loan agreement provided inter alia for installment payments
to occur on July 30, August 30, September 30, and October 30, 1981. Id.
3'
The resolutions were adopted in response to the Costa Rican government's fiscal difficulties. 570 F. Supp. at 874-75.
Costa Rica continues to suffer economic hardship. As recently as March 1984, Mexico
provided a $50 million loan to Costa Rica to prevent its defaulting on interest payments on
its intergovernmental debt, which totalled more than $3 billion at that time. Costa Rica
owed an additional $200 million in interest due in 1984 to private banks. Wall. St. J., Apr. 5,
1984, at 34, col. 5.
32 570 F. Supp. at 876.
" Id. at 881-82.
31 Id. The court also identified two other factors justifying designation of New York as
the debt situs. These factors included Defendant's consent to having the letter agreement
construed in accordance with New York law and the fact that Defendants had assets in the
United States. Id.
35 E.g., United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
'i
's
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state's effective confiscation of property, without compensation, is
repugnant to the Constitution and laws of this nation." 36 Finally,
addressing the traditional concern for international comity, 37 the
court concluded that its effective reversal of the Costa Rican decrees would not alter United States relations with Costa Rica.38
The court reasoned that Costa Rica could not have expected to
have dominion over the bank's debts because of the inability of a
foreign state to complete an expropriation beyond its borders. 9
III.

THE DECISION .

In its en banc rehearing of the Allied Bank case, the Second Circuit court refused to sanction the Costa Rican action under act of
state principles.'0 The court stated that invocation of the doctrine
depends exclusively on the situs of the debt at the time of the purported taking."' According the situs question a specialized analysis, 4 2 the court first noted that Costa Rica's purported taking could
not "come to complete fruition within the dominion of the [foreign] government," mandating location of the debt within the
United States.'3 The court then applied situs criteria applicable to
tangible property, noting that the Costa Rican banks had conceded
jurisdiction in New York and that they had agreed to pay the debt
in New York in United States dollars." The court concluded that
under either analysis, the debt's situs was the United States, precluding application of the act of state doctrine.' 5
Having dispensed with any act of state protection for the Costa
Rican action, the en banc panel then held that the directives contravened both United States law and policy. 4' The court found the

11
37

570 F. Supp. at 882.
Id. at 882-83. For an explanation of the concept of international comity, see supra note

15.
570 F. Supp. at 883. For a discussion of United States - Costa Rican relations during
the Costa Rican economic crisis, see infra note 46.
11 570 F. Supp. at 884.
'0 Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985).
1 Id. at 521.
42 Id.
Citing Tabacalera Serveriano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), the court stated that "the concept of the situs
of a debt for act of state purposes differs from the ordinary concept," requiring a specialized
situs analysis.
43 Id.
" Id. at 521-22.
45

Id. at 522.

11 Id. at 522-23.
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actions inconsistent with United States law on two grounds. First,
the court noted that the debt deferral violated established United
States procedure for resolving both intergovernmental and private
debt difficulties.' 7 Second, the panel stated that the Costa Rican
directives simply violated express provisions of the loan contracts. 48 The court similarly concluded that the Costa Rican actions contravened United States policy, noting that recognition of
the directives would be inconsistent with the orderly resolution of
international debt problems and with the maintenance of the
United States' status as a major source of international credit.' 9
IV.

COMMENT

By reversing its prior holding, the en banc Second Circuit properly refuted both the district court's and its own erroneous conclusions concerning the act of state doctrine. The en banc panel's refusal to affirm the district court's application of the doctrine
reflected an understanding of the doctrine's territorial limitations.
The court properly identified the Costa Rican banks' consent to
jurisdiction and to payment in New York as crucial to its situs determination. As the Second Circuit had previously stated, "[F]or
purpose of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'located' within a
foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or collect
it." 5 0 That power "generally depends on jurisdiction over the person of the debtor."5 1 Moreover, the Second Circuit had ruled that a
debt's repayment site constitutes its situs for act of state purposes. 2 Accordingly, Cost Rica's attempted extraterritoral action

"
48
49

60

Id. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds

sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
5' Id. at 1365 (citing Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 214 (1904)).
02 United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981). But see Perez v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 61 N.Y. 2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S. 2d 689 (1984). In Garcia, Plaintiff purchased certificates of deposit from Chase Manhattan, a U.S. bank with a Cuban branch
office. The bank's officers guaranteed payment upon demand in U.S. dollars at any Chase
branch worldwide. When the revolutionary government of Cuba seized Plaintiff's account,
Plaintiff instituted an action against Chase Manhattan seeking payment. Chase asserted
that the act of state doctrine extinguished its liability. 735 F.2d at 646-49.
In rejecting Chase's claim, the court held that the act of state doctrine did not apply,
noting that the case simply involved a private dispute between a United States bank and
one of its depositors. 735 F.2d at 6451. The court did reaffirm, however, the rule that a
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was impermissible under well-settled act of state principles.
The court's reversal of its ruling that the Costa Rican decrees
were consistent with United States law is likewise accurate. As the
court notes, recognition of the decrees would require the court to
vitiate an express provision of the contract between the parties in
violation of fundamental contract law principles. The debtor banks
expressly guaranteed repayment, notwithstanding any future action by the Costa Rican government to bar external payment of
United States dollars."5 The risk of unavailability of foreign exchange had therefore been allocated to the debtor, not to the creditor.5 ' Consequently, Plaintiff justifiably demanded payment after
the Costa Rican government took the precise action envisioned by
the contract. 5

debt's situs is where the debt is payable and where the debtor can be found. "[W]here a
foreign government has both the parties and the res'before it and alters their relationship
thereto, our courts realize that there is little that they can do to change the legal relationship." Id. at 650 n.5.
63 The loan contracts contained the following language:
7. Events of Default:
If any of the following events of default should occur and is not remedied within
a period of 30 days as of the date of occurrence, the Agent Bank may, by a written
notice to the Borrower[,J declare the promissory notes to be due and payable. In
such an event, they shall be considered to be due without presentment, demand,
protest or any other notice to the Borrower, all of which are expressly waived by
this agreement:
7.1 Any payment of principal or interest under this transaction shall not have
been paid on its maturity date. If the Borrower shall not effect any payment of
principal or interest on the promissory notes at maturity, due solely to the omission or refusal by the Central Bank of Costa Rica to provide the necessary U.S.
Dollars, such an event shall not be considered to be an event of default which
would justify the demandability of the obligation, during a period of 10 days after
such maturity date.
757 F.2d 516, 522 n.4.
" See Brief for the United States Government as Amicus Curiae at 16, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984), vacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
51 Defendants argued on rehearing that private contracts may be subject to modification
in the public interest. Cited examples include the government's interference with private
contracts during period of severe inflation pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1982). Defendants also noted that states have enacted debt
moratoriums under the Constitution's contract clause, with the Supreme Court's blessing.
See Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Supreme Court upheld
a Minnesota "mortgage moratorium law" enacted in response to the Depression, precluding
mortgage holders from foreclosing on mortgagors); accord, East New York Savings Bank v.
Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945) (upholding similar New York legislation). The contract clause,
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, Cl. 1, by its terms applies, however, only to the states of the United
States and not to the federal government. Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States 242 U.S.
409, 418 (1917); Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 643 (1884). Accordingly, the contract clause
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While identifying controlling contract law, the court wisely chose
not to discuss a possible analogy between the Costa Rican directives and the United States bankruptcy law. Significantly, this
analogy was the principal ground on which the court based its
prior holding that the directives comported with United States
law.5 6 The bankruptcy analogy, while attractive at first glance, disintegrates upon careful scrutiny. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code (11 U.S.C. § 304 (1982)), premised on comity considerations,
provides that a United States creditor's rights may be subordinated to a restructuring of foreign debt under certain circumstances.5 7 In this case, however, no authentic debt rescheduling

is inapplicable to Costa Rica by its terms or by analogy. See Brief for Defendants - Appellees on Rehearing at 29-32, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,
No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984), vacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant-Appellee on Rehearing].
Moreover, the courts of New York and of the Second Circuit have, as a policy matter,
rejected defenses to payment on New York debts based on foreign moratorium decrees or
other acts by debtor nations. See, e.g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens &
Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 14 F. Supp. 927, 929 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936); Egyes v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 165 F.2d 539, 541 (2d Cir.
1948). This policy of giving effect to the "justified expectations of the parties to the contract" is of paramount importance to New York's preeminent position within the financial
community. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y. 2d 220, 226-27,
333 N.E.2d 168, 172-73, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
6 Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1984). The court stated that Costa Rica's prohibition on external payment resembled Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1982). This section is designed to aid in the "administration of assets
of the foreign debtor located in this country, the prevention of dismemberment of assets
located here by local creditors, and the provision of other relief appropriate under the circumstances." See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 304.01 et seq. (15th ed. 1984). Courts are to
be guided by principles of comity in fashioning relief under the Code. See H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978).
To ensure § 304 protection, a foreign representative (trustee, administrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding) must file a petition with a United States
bankruptcy court. United States creditors' rights may then be subordinated to a foreign
debt reorganization if such relief would guarantee the:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such
estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the
order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
11 U.S.C. § 304 (1982).
For a related discussion of the applicability of United States bankruptcy principles to
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proceeding 8 had been initiated by the Costa Rican banks, precluding § 304's application. Moreover, the banks never sought § 304
protection, evidencing their perceived inability to satisfy the provision's requirements.
Application of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code 59 is similarly inappropriate. This provision, cited by the appellate court in its initial
opinion,60 provides a variety of safeguards for creditors forced to
participate in debtor-initiated bankruptcy proceedings.6 1 The
Costa Rican decrees did not, however, provide any procedures resembling those found in § 362.62 Consequently, comparison of the
Costa Rican directives with § 362 is inapposite.
While therefore apparent that the Costa Rican actions contravened United States law, that the directives were inconsistent with
United States foreign policy is less certain. One strong indicia of
United States government policy is, however, the views expressed
by the United States as amicus curiae on rehearing.6 3 In its amicus
foreign debt rescheduling, see Note, Procedural Guidelinesfor Renegotiating LDC Debt: An
Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305 (1981).
" "'[F]oreign proceeding' means proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and
whether or not under the bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization..
11 U.S.C. § 101(20) (Supp.
II 1984) (emphasis added).
The Costa Rican banks' action was neither a judicial nor administrative proceeding, but
merely a sudden cessation of payments to its creditors. Consequently, Defendants could not
rely on § 304's protections.
5 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
o Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714, slip op.
at 3223 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984).
"' Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay, upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, of a variety of actions which would affect the property of a debtor. See
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.01 et seq. (15th ed. 1984). The section also provides, however, a procedure by which a claimant may seek relief from the stay. The process includes,
inter alia an opportunity for creditors to file a claim, and a chance to be heard at a hearing.
See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.08, et. seq. (15th ed. 1984).
" "The decrees were enacted without any notice to or consultation with creditors. They
contained no provision for giving notice to creditors, the filing of claims or the opportunity
to be heard. They contained no mechanism for either proving or disproving insolvency.
They contained no provision for the marshalling of assets. They contained no provision for
the fair and equal treatment for creditors. They contained no prohibition against preferential payments to creditors, or other safeguards. They contained no provision for judicial
administration or review. They were simply a bald, discriminatory cessation of the payment
of debts to a targeted group of creditors." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant on Rehearing at 22,
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. April
23, 1984), vacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3086 (U.S. July 26, 1985) (No. 85-146).
13 The U.S. government's position in Allied was formulated by the Department of State,
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briefs, the United States advanced essentially two legitimate reasons why the Costa Rican actions conflicted with United States
policy interests. First, the government noted that the United
States seeks to promote financial stability and economic growth in
debtor nations.6 4 Such prosperity, the government notes, will result
from policies designed to encourage new loans to debtor nations by
external creditors. Sanction of the Costa Rican actions, which denied foreign creditors their express contractual rights, could only
discourage future lending. 5 Second, the government correctly asserts that United States approval of the Costa Rican directives
would postpone a debtor nation's adoption of needed economic reforms. 6 Consequently, the debtor could use United States courts
to avoid swift resolution of international debt problems, to the detriment of creditors in the United States and manifestly inconsistent with United States policy aims. 7
Notwithstanding the United States' explicit condemnation of the
Costa Rican directives as amicus, there is evidence that both the
executive and the legislative branches endorse the Costa Rican actions. The Costa Rican government had previously failed to pay its
intergovernmental debt,6 8 triggering the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961.69 The Act prohibits aid to defaulting nations absent presidential determination that further assistance to such countries "is
in the national interest. '7 0 Pursuant to this language, the President
twice advised Congress that it should grant continued aid to Costa
Rica.7 1 Moreover, the House of Representatives expressed support

the Department of Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
collaboration with the Department of Justice. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d
Cir. April 23, 1984), vacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
United States Amicus Brief]; Tigert, Allied Bank International:A United States Government Perspective, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 511, 513 at n.7, (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Tigert, Government Perspective].
" United States Amicus Brief at 2-3.
6

Id.

Id. See also Tigert, Government Perspective, supra note 63, at 521.
6 United States Amicus Brief at 2-3. See also Tigert, Government Perspective, supra
note 63.
" Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir.
April 23, 1984).
69 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pua. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
70 22 U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1982).
" In an official message to leaders within the executive and legislative branches concerning Costa Rican loan defaults, the President advised that "[a] continuation of U.S. assistance to Costa Rica is consistent with the commitment of this administration and in Con"
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for Costa Rica in two concurrent resolutions. 72 This exercise of
presidential authority, taken with the explicit approval of Congress, is presidential authority at its zenith. 73 In these circumstances, the President's action may possibly be
seen to have per74
sonified the policy of the federal government.
That this expression of support came in an intergovernmental
debt context does not alter the analysis. Section 2370(e)(1) of the
Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to suspend aid to
any country confiscating the private property of any citizen or
corporation or taking "steps to repudiate or nullify existing contracts or agreements" with United States subject 75 (emphasis
added). To date, neither the President nor Congress has invoked
this provision with reference to the Costa Rican action, giving rise
to an inference of presidential and congressional approval.
Weighing the statements of the government as amicus and the
conflicting acts by the President and Congress, the United States
policy appears to forbid unilateral deferral of international debt.
Regardless of presidential, congressional, and statutory mandates
to maintain foreign assistance to Costa Rica, the United States
government simply has not endorsed the unilateral abrogation of
private commercial loan contracts by debtor governments. Although in limited circumstances courts have ignored public policy
formulation by the Department of State, 76 in this case the governing policy concerns are clear: the promotion of loans to debtor

gress to help Costa Rica regain economic viability. We therefore regard such assistance...
as vital and in the national interest. We are hopeful that bilateral debt restructuring will be
completed within the next several months." Letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to
Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Oct. 11, 1983, 129 CONG. REc. H8243 (daily ed.
Oct. 17, 1983) (Executive Communications No. 1990); Letter from Secretary of State George
Shultz to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., March 18,
1983, 129 CONG. REC. H1461 (daily ed. March 21, 1983) (Executive Communications No.
671).
"' H.R. Con. Res. 423, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H10,205 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1982). See also H.R. Con. Res. 194, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H10,350 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 1983).
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson J.,
concurring) (cited in Brief for Defendants - Appellees on Rehearing at 18, n.21).
"' 343 U.S. at 636.
7- 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(1982).
7' "While the recognition and maintenance of diplomatic relations with a foreign government are political matters within the province of the executive department of the federal
government, questions regarding the administration of estates and the determination of
rights and interests in property in the United States ordinarily are matters for determination by the courts of competent jurisdiction." Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353
F.2d 47, 52 n.5 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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nations through protection of the justified expectations of the parties to the loan agreements, and the consequent return of debtor
nations to financial stability.
With its decision in Allied Bank, the Second Circuit has delineated the parameters of the act of state doctrine and the extent to
which unilateral foreign debt deferrals are inconsistent with
United States law. The accuracy of the court's ruling that the
Costa Rican action violated United States foreign policy is also apparent, though muddied by the presidential and congressional response to Costa Rican economic hardship. The holding can be
viewed in great part as a reaction to the concerns of the commercial banking community. 77 Latin American nations continue to experience economic difficultiesa7 creating great risks for international lenders. Consequently, the en banc Second Circuit has
responded by restoring a measure of certainty to Latin American
lending, purportedly ensuring a reasonably safe loan market for
lenders and a resulting supply of funds for cash-strapped debtor
nations.
Marc J. Lewyn

77 See generally Rowe, Three Years of Belt Tightening and There's No Payoff in Sight,
Wash. Post (National Weekly Edition), October 21, 1985, at 19; A. Lewis, Debts and Reality, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1984, at A15, col. 5; Kissinger, It's A Crisis: It Can Be Solved,
Wash. Post, June 24, 1984, at 138.
78 See generally Rowe, Three Years of Belt Tightening and There's No Payoff in Sight,
Wash. Post (National Weekly Edition), October 21, 1985, at 19.

